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ABSTRACT. This article explores the competing relations between ethnic, religious 
and racial identities in contemporary Tanzania at a time of rapid socioeconomic 
change and in the face of the declining authority and legitimacy of the state. During 
nearly four decades of one-party rule the state has pursued policies - educational, 
linguistic, developmental, etc. - aimed at constructing a secular national identity 
capable of uniting diverse social groups under the banner of African socialism. 
However, economic retrenchment in the 1980s and political liberalisation in the 1990s 
has contributed directly to a series of upheavals leading many Tanzanians to redefine 
the structures of common difference and to a fracturing of national identity. This 
article seeks to understand the reasons for the upsurge of conflict and cultural 
fragmentation in the 1990s. 
This article is concerned to understand the processes which underlie social 
and cultural fragmentation and conflict in Tanzania. In particular, I seek to 
understand what appears to be an inherent contradiction between local 
conceptions regarding the civic-territorial model of secular national identity 
which the ruling party attempted to construct and impose on its citizens, 
and more ‘fundamental’ notions of social identity based on ideas of ethnicity 
and religion which pre-date the formation of the modem state. 
I begin by reviewing the efforts of the former one-party state to construct 
a shared sense of citizenship and national identity. The collapse of these 
effort’s in the 1980s is, I argue, important for understanding curr‘ent 
antipathies and escalating religious, ethnic and racial strife. I then examine 
events surrounding a 1993 ‘Muslim riot’ in terms of three major factors 
which underlie rapidly changing relations between Muslims and Christians. 
These factors are (i) differential access to formal, secular education and to 
employment; (ii) Christian and Muslim appreciation of education; and (iii) 
their varying degrees of involvement in and commitment to secular 
government programmes. 
However, underlying popular discourse about religious ‘fundamentalism’ 
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is a concern about growing socio-economic inequality. Social understand- 
ings about race, ethnicity and religion are deeply intertwined with long- 
standing patterns of elite politics and local perceptions about inequality. 
The collapsing authority of the ruling party brought not only economic 
stagnation but also political liberalisation and multiparty politics. Official 
censorship ended with the one-party state, and a thriving local press and 
media has developed providing a means for the dissemination of ethnic, 
racial and religious views which has promoted cultural and religious 
chauvinism. 
The rise and demise of Tanzanian national identity, 1961-1986 
Tanganyika African National Union (TANU), the nationalist party which 
won the referenda on independence, was formed in 1954 as an amalgam of 
political and ethnic groups who supported Julius Nyerere’s programme for 
African self-rule. A key feature of Nyerere’s programme was an ideology 
which centred on the moral qualities of the individual and the egalitarian 
nature of Tanganyikan African society. 
In 1961 TANU, with Nyerere - a British-educated Roman Catholic and 
Fabian socialist - as prime minister, came into power. The early sixties saw 
the party build up its organisation at the same time as it shifted from a 
gradualist, voluntaristic and incremental development strategy towards a 
transformationalist approach which emphasised equality, democracy and 
socialism (Yeager 1989; Hedlund and Lundahl 1989). The economic 
situation stymied the nationalist programme of Africanisation of the civil 
service and indigenising the economy; problems were further compounded 
by the 1964 Union with Zanzibar which linked the latter’s racial and ethnic 
tensions to Nyerere’s as yet ill-defined programme of nation-building. The 
1967 Arusha Declaration restated the centrality of the party in achieving 
agricultural self-reliance through a programme of mass participation and 
equality in the distribution of national wealth, but set in motion two 
contradictory processes. First, a growing centralisation of power in state 
and party institutions - i.e. the creation of a one-party system, reform and 
centralisation of local government, control over trades unions, military and 
police, and the authority of party over government, etc. - was put into 
place, which ensured compliance with central policy directives. Second, 
there occurred an elaboration of a socialist ideology which entailed the 
nationalisation of the economy and moral exhortations to citizens to work 
hard to realize ujamaa [‘familyhood’, but often translated as socialism] 
(F. Burke 1964; Nyerere 1964). 
Ujamaa revolved around domestic policy, and in particular educating and 
mobilising the population of approximately 120 ethnic groups around the 
party to achieve agricultural self-reliance. Educational reform was both 
structural and curricular. Integrated non-racial education was instituted 
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early, followed by major investment in primary, secondary and post- 
secondary education to expand access to Africans (Kaduma 1974). At the 
same time, free primary education was made universally available, and adult 
and technical education was initiated. 
The 1967 ‘Education for Self-Reliance’ policy called for major changes in 
the educational curriculum to promote Tanzania’s political philosophy 
(through promotion of Swahili as a national language and through special 
courses), vocational training (especially in agriculture), changes in the 
organisation of the schools, and increased party control over access to 
higher education. 
By the late seventies the ‘social control element of educational policy . . . 
[represented] the attempt to build up and diffuse mass understanding and 
internalization of those common attributes that together form the basis of 
Tanzanian citizenship’ (Court 1979: 214). An emphasis on reduced elite 
privileges, on leadership responsibility, social justice and equality, the 
dignity of labour, etc. were to be pursued in a non-racial, secular fashion 
under party guidance. On the one hand, educational policy was intended to 
provide the training necessary to transform agriculture; on the other hand, 
transformation was to be accomplished through inculcating the basic tenets 
of citizenship and national identity as envisaged by Nyerere. It was, in 
short, the intention that public education would turn peasants into modem 
Tanzanians. 
A major part of the effort to create and foster a sense of political 
consciousness and national identity involved the promotion and use of 
Kiswahili in public education and national politics. While Kiswahili had 
evolved as the language of trade during the colonial period, it was in fact 
the first language of a relatively small population resident on the north 
Kenyan coast and off-shore islands. The task of standardising Swahili began 
in 1930 when the British established the Inter-Territorial Language 
Committee to promote the Zanzibar dialect for Territorial adoption 
(Blommaert 1996). Despite its use and promotion by the German colonial 
administration, knowledge of Kiswahili was limited to the coast and to 
towns. The British also established a Swahili press (Scotton 1978). 
TANU appears to have adopted Swahili shortly after the party was 
formed, probably to communicate with its diverse ethnic membership; 1962 
was the first time that Nyerere addressed the Bunge (parliament) in Kiswahili 
- rather than in English - making an important symbolic and political 
statement about African culture (Khamis 1974). However, it was only in 
1968 that Kiswahili became the official language for politics/administration 
and for instruction in primary schools and adult education (it was 
subsequently used in high schools to teach history and political education). 
While it is true, as Blommaert (1996: 250) has argued, that the official 
position on Kiswahili was far less radical in its sweep than some nationalists 
liked, it would be incorrect to assume that efforts to develop cultural 
nationalism were in any way limited to the schools. Specifically, the 
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erstwhile Ministry of National Culture and Youth operated a range of 
cultural programmes including: museums; sport; film censorship; theatre; 
and Swahili language promotion (Mbuguni and Ruhumbika 1974). In 
addition, there were political education classes, paramilitary training for the 
people’s militia, as well as an expanded role for the party in industry and in 
schools (i.e. the TANU Youth League) to propagate and inculcate socialist 
values and attitudes through Kiswahili. After the announcement of the 
Mwongozo or Guidelines for TANU officials in 1971, efforts were also made 
to develop Swahili terms to facilitate a vernacular ‘class analysis’. 
In retrospect, while the above efforts fell short of creating a ‘national 
culture’ seen as ‘the sum total of a people’s way of life in their effort to live, 
to continue living and to develop as a nation’ (Mbuguni and Ruhumbika 
1974: 275), the party had set out to construct a ‘modern nation’ along these 
lines. Nyerere’s moral exhortations, together with policy pronouncements, 
were clearly aimed at realising a society based around a ‘new man’: anti- 
capitalist, egalitarian, a hard worker and responsive to moral rather than 
material incentives. Such a person would, in leaving behind particularistic 
ethnic concerns, adopt a new national culture as represented in part by 
Kiswahili (at that time a symbol of national unity and socialism) (Khamis 
1974: 294; Hedlund and Lundahl 1989). 
Thus the party increasingly took up the idea of nation-building or 
kujenga taifa (literally ‘to construct a nation’) rather than creating a 
homogeneous national culture as the basis for garnering public support for 
its policies and programmes (Blommaert 1996). However, the ideology of 
nation-building underpinning ujamaa began to come unstuck on a welter of 
internal contradictions - e.g. authoritarian and hierarchic educational 
practices, a lack of correspondence between educational qualifications and 
opportunities in the labour market - and the evaporation of meaningful 
mass participation in, and local accountability of, government. In addition, 
development programmes faltered as the party moved to enforce - 
villagisatiod resettlement, communal production, rural cooperatives, etc. - 
compliance with its policies (e.g. Boeson et al. 1977; Yeager 1989). Further, 
by the late 1970s it was becoming apparent that government policies were 
directly contributing to economic stagnation, inflation and commodity 
shortages, and corruption. Indeed, the growing inefficiency of public 
institutions was matched by a doubling of dependence on foreign aid 
between 1969 and 1983, a situation made worse by the cost of the Ugandan 
war, worsening terms of trade and declining agricultural production. 
The period from the late 1970s to the mid-1980s was one of increasing 
economic hardship and growing public scepticism of government in the face 
of a continuing socialist rhetoric and state inefficiency. Significantly, while 
the national economy collapsed an unprecedented growth in the public 
sector occurred which substantially increased civil service and party jobs 
(Yeager 1989: 76). 
Structural adjustment policies adopted in the mid- 1980s involved major 
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funding cuts in education and health; urban unemployment and poverty 
increased substantially (Helleiner 1987). The party’s achievement was to 
create employment for graduates of the public school system, the vast 
majority of whom were Christians from up-country areas. Despite the key 
role given to the educational system by nationalists, structural adjustment 
resulted in a massive drop in school attendance (from 93 per cent in 1980 to 
74 per cent in 1990), and rising failure and drop-out rates (24.2 per cent and 
25-30 per cent, respectively).’ The very instrument chosen to construct civil 
society and national identity was collapsing, while growing social inequality 
was undermining national unity. 
The unravelling of socialist policies brought to a halt efforts to mould 
national identity and political consciousness. While a generation of children 
- between 1968 and 1978 - did, to varying degrees, become ‘cultural 
nationalists’, events subsequent to their departure from school altered their 
outlook and orientation. Indeed, by the mid-1980s it was the beneficiaries of 
this political and educational system who led opposition to single-party rule. 
In effect, ethnic, religious and racial attitudes from the pre-colonial 
period resurfaced beginning with social cleavages between immigrant ethnic 
groups (i.e. Persian ‘Shirazi’, followed by Omani Arabs and south Asians) 
and Africans (Nimtz 1980: ch. 3; Pouwels 1987; Amiji 1969). Concern about 
immigrants reappeared in the form of racial tensions concerning social 
inequality. 
During the colonial period a massive migration of watu wa bara or up- 
country Africans to coastal towns occurred, a process which displaced local 
African Muslims, fuelled religious resentment, and gave an impetus to new 
forms of urban social organisation, status and identity (Campbell forth- 
coming). In the 1940s and 1950s African nationalism fed off perceptions of 
Asian racial difference and privilege and, at roughly the same time, access 
to secular education became systematically linked with access to waged 
work and wealth. 
Waged work is predominantly located on the coast and in urban centres. 
Contrary to Issa Shivji, the growth of wage labour did not result in a class 
system (1986). Instead, the labour market affected a small percentage of the 
national population - for example factory, workers numbered 52,000 in 
1952 rising to 66,000 in 1966 - exhibited great geographic and workplace 
dispersal, and had a brief history of labour organisation marked by 
cooptation and control by the state (ibid: 114). In addition, while the 
number of wage employed people rose greatly as a percentage of the urban 
population, by 1991 it had peaked at approximately 36 per cent and has 
since declined (Tripp 1997: 31). 
As important as urban wage-based occupations may have been to a small 
percentage of the population, with the significant exception of the urban 
middle class there is little evidence that class provided an enduring collective 
identity. Following Smith, in Tanzania ‘the limited emotional appeal and 
lack of cultural depth’ of class arises partly from the fact that most urban 
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workers are rural migrants for whom local/regional attachments remain 
important (Smith 1991: 5). Because urban incomes were tightly controlled by 
government inflation and structural adjustment eroded urban incomes to the 
point where individuals survived by pursuing multiple forms of self-employ- 
ment (Tripp 1997). This is not to argue that, from time to time and with 
respect to particular professions, class or occupation has no social or political 
salience, only that class has not formed the basis of a collective identity in 
any way comparable to ethnicity and religion. 
Thus, despite attempts to create an overarching national identity and 
reshape what it saw as the primordial, anti-modem pull of ethnic, cultural 
and religious sentiment, by the late 1970s these latter identities were once 
again resurfacing. At the same time many beneficiaries of national 
development - artisans, shopkeepers and others with more tenuous 
livelihoods - were now facing an ambiguous and uncertain future. Together 
with a large and growing urban population of unemployed and growing 
numbers of casual labour, a large urban social strata exists which is 
attracted to populist appeals and religious ‘fundamentalism’. For the urban 
poor, fundamentalism offers a vision of the world ‘turned inside out’, that 
is, a vision of a future untainted by political failure (Gilsenan 1982: ch. 10). 
Contemporary Tanzanian politics is organised around thirteen political 
parties, most possessing only a regional and/or ethnic political base (van 
Cranenburgh 1996). Apart from opposing Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM, 
formerly TANU), the other parties have poorly articulated programmes, a 
fact which contributes to a sense of social fragmentation as politicians argue 
over ‘indigenisation’, the economy, corruption and the state of the Union 
with Zanzibar. The country’s 120 ethnic groups (excluding Asians) are 
generally small and are equally divided between Islam, Christianity and 
animism. And Dar es Salaam, where the Bunge is located, is itself a large 
multiethnic, multifaith conurbation where the differences between rich and 
poor are easily observed and where ethnicity and religion are important, 
observable facets of daily life (Campbell et al. 1995). 
Political liberalisation saw the development of a thriving local press 
which competes with the semi-official national English language daily The 
Daily News and The Daily News on Saturday. Until the mid-1980s the latter 
two papers constituted the English language press and possessed a 
reputation for idiosyncratic reporting which often revealed government 
incompetence, though they always cleaved to the government line in their 
commentary and construal of events. The government and CCM also 
publish and distribute other official and semi-official Kiswahili newspapers 
(e.g. Uhuru). 
Since 1990, an independent press has developed which includes several 
privately owned English language newspapers (e.g. The Tribune, Business 
Times, The Express) and monthly magazines (e.g. Change, Weekly Mail). 
Some publications are connected to specific political parties and/or wealthy, 
influential individuals. In recent years the ‘Swahili press’ (e.g. Mwananchi, 
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Bahari, Majira, Rai, Shaba, etc.) has also grown and reports both official 
and private views. Standards of writing and reporting vary widely, as does 
the extent to which editorial opinion is independent of partisan political 
interests. It was the independent press which ‘countered the perpetually one- 
sided reporting of the state-owned print media, exposing popular resentment 
of corruption and abuse of power within CCM’ (Chege 1994: 54). 
Until recently radio was government owned and, with the exception of 
Zanzibar, neither terrestrial nor satellite television existed. In the early 
1990s, a small privately owned FM station was established in Dar es Salaam 
and, in time to cover the Gulf War in 1991, two privately owned terrestrial 
channels - one African, the other Asian-owned - were set-up. In 1993 the 
television stations were also caught up in rising racial and ethnic tension as 
the Asian station owner allegedly threatened to blow up the African-owned 
station.2 
On 23 January 1993 the newly formed but unregistered Democratic Party 
(DP) held a political rally in Dar es Salaam as part of the run-up to 
multiparty elections in 1995. At the rally ‘thousands of people, mainly 
youths’ came to hear 
party leader Reverend Christopher Mtikila deliver an emotional speech complaining 
of alleged exploitation by the businesses of Asian origin. He also reiterated his 
rejection of the Tanzanian Union. After the rally some youths pelted cars driven by 
people of Asian  rigi in.^ 
Immediately following the ‘riot’, CCM publicly condemned so-called ‘DP 
political thuggery’. Shortly thereafter, the ‘self-styled Reverend’ Mtikila 
found himself in court charged with sedition, illegal assembly and 
attempting to cause a breach of the peace. He was alleged to have told the 
rally that ‘Tanzania had been sold away and walala hoi (mainlanders) were 
deprived of their wealth by people of Asian origin’; that ‘Zanzibaris and 
people of Arab origin should leave the country immediately’; and that ‘all 
CCM leaders were  bandit^'.^ 
Rev. Mtikila was released on bail on 9 February though both he and his 
party were to face continuing difficulties in court and in obtaining legal 
recognition. The statements attributed to him refer to a controversy 
regarding Zanzibar’s contravention of constitutional provisions federating 
the mainland and the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba when it unilaterally 
joined the Organization of Islamic Conferences. Remarks about exploitative 
Asians refer to long simmering African nationalist allegations that all Asian 
businessmen were/are involved in the black market, with illegal drugs, etc. 
and in buying influence and protection. Both accusations draw attention to 
pivotal political questions of the mainland’s relationship to (‘Arab’ and 
Muslim) Zanzibar, and the relationship between mainland Africans and 
Asians in running the national economy. 
Public scrutiny of the relation between politics, religion and ethnicity 
extended well beyond electoral issues, to include allegations that the minister 
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of finance had erected a mosque in the Treasury at taxpayers’ expense; the 
dismissal of school children in an up-country school allegedly because of 
‘tribalism’; and concern about the Islamic Republic of Iran’s funding of 
rural development in a Muslim coastal d i s t r i~ t .~  
Rampaging Muslims: the 1993 not in context 
Prior to examining the riot it is instructive to briefly examine the historical 
development of Islam in Tanzania. Following limited proselytisation in the 
nineteenth century, a major wave of Islamic conversion occurred between 
1904 and 1924 due to the dislocation caused by war, the consolidation of 
the German colonial state, and the message of the new faith (Trimingham 
1964; Nimtz 1980). Until the 1930s, coastal towns like Dar es Salaam were 
predominantly Muslim which meant that as increasing numbers of up- 
country migrants arrived tension between Muslims and Christians grew (at 
a time when to be Christian was seen as being anti-Muslim) (Anthony 1983: 
18 1). Religious conversion was facilitated through Sufi brotherhoods who 
employed heterodox ritual practices which exhibited ‘African’ cultural 
elements and which bypassed ‘Arabs’, whom Africans believed were 
blocking their access to Islam. 
There is little doubt that the recency of African conversion to Sunni 
Islam means that this community is quite different from of Ibadhi Arabs 
(now localised in Zanzibar) and from the urban-based Asian Shia commu- 
nities (Amiji 1969; Schildknecht 1969). The Muslim community in East 
Africa confronts a double contradiction: on the one hand, effective religious 
organisation lies with the Shia, on the other hand, the Sunni-Shia division 
is ‘racial’. Sect, class and race intersect with the result that division rather 
than consensus prevails amongst Tanzanian Muslims. The crucial point is 
that Asians occupied the middle tier of the colonial racial hierarchy 
expressed in a system of racial segregation and socioeconomic stratification. 
Their visibility, corporate organisation, the increasingly closed nature of 
their communities and their apparent affluence meant that Asians became 
the object of African animosity. 
At the height of the Africanisation of the civil service and indigenisation 
of the economy in the 1960s government created the Supreme Council of 
Tanzanian Muslims (BAKWATA) to bring together all Tanzanian Muslims 
- Sunni and Shia, African, Asian and Arab - to assist Muslim Africans. 
There appears to have been two very different perceptions guiding the 
creation of the council: government interests in integrating and controlling a 
large Muslim population, and the aspirations of a very diverse Muslim 
community for assistance and to articulate their own interests (Constantin 
1994). In the absence of organised Muslim political parties and recognised 
Muslim leaders, the Council has attempted to co-opt local Muslims and 
incorporate them into clientelist political networks. 
Politics of identity in Tanzania 113 
In 1981, BAKWATA was accused of inefficiency and corruption by 
President Aboud Jumbe of Zanzibar, who unsuccessfully attempted to 
bypass it and create a second national council. Jumbe, apparently with 
support from the Islamic World League, lost his bid in part because his 
authority was based on his government post which he subsequently lost 
(Constantin 1993: 50). In addition, BAKWATA has been challenged by 
several short-lived Sunni associations including the conservative All Muslim 
National Union of Tanganyika in the mid-60s (Chande 1993); the Iranian- 
influenced Tanzanian ‘Preachers of Islam’ (who were deported from 
Mombasa following riots in 1987 and who are banned from speaking in 
Tanzanian towns); and, most recently, by the Quran Development Council 
(BALUKTA) based at Mtoro mosque in Dar es Salaam (see below; Chande 
1993: 52, n. 27; Balda 1993: 230, n. 17). 
In January 1993, fasting for Ramadan began and lasted until 24 
February when special prayers were called in the mosques of Dar es Salaam 
to mark the breaking of the fast. The president of Tanzania, himself a 
Muslim, attended prayers at State House at which the chief kadh of 
Tanzania urged religious tolerance. On 9 April, Good Friday was marked 
nationally in Dar es Salaam by Christian services at which a bishop called 
for ‘peace and tolerance’.6 However, while Christians were in church, Sheik 
Yahya, a Sunni and leader of the Quran Development Council of Tanzania 
(BALUKTA), allegedly incited Muslims at the Magomeni Islamic Centre in 
Dar es Salaam to ‘demolish all Dar es Salaam pork butcheries’. According 
to the police, crowds converged on the Islamic Centre in Kigogo while 
others attacked and demolished nearby pork shops, following which rioters 
returned to the Centre to be congratulated by their leaders who resolved to 
continue the attacks the following day.7 Subsequently thirty-eight people 
were charged with ‘rioting’ and illegal assembly, and Sh. Yahya was 
detained under a government crackdown on ‘Muslim fundamentalists’. 
The chief kudh, speaking on behalf of the Council (BAKWATA), 
immediately denounced the riot. At the same time, Mtoro mosque, with 
which Sh. Yahya was reputedly linked, disassociated itself from him and the 
riots. However, the continued detention of the sheik and his ‘followers’ led 
to a subsequent ‘Muslim demonstration’ outside the court resulting in 
charges being brought against twelve more individuals for an illegal 
demonstration ‘to force the release of 30 other Muslims’.8 
Attribution, allegation and misrepresentation: unravelling contemporary truths 
Following the riot non-Muslims began attributing responsibility for certain 
events to ‘Muslim fundamentalists’ which had no basis in fact; however, this 
web of allegation and accusation became nearly as important as the events 
themselves. Immediately after the riot, and while members of BALUKTA 
remained in jail, BAKWATA held a national Muslim convention attended 
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by African Sunni, Asian Shia and Asian Memon and Baluchi representatives 
and financed by private  donation^.^ 
In June 1994, forty-three students at a Catholic Girls’ Secondary School 
died in a fire, and this was followed by an arson attack against a second 
Christian boarding school. In July 1994, police used teargas to disperse 
‘fundamentalists’ at a Mosque in the town of Morogoro where a year earlier 
three Sudanese imams were deported for ‘preaching intolerance’.’O Perhaps 
unsurprisingly, seventeen months after the‘pork butcheries’ riot, two more 
imams joined the sixteen individuals in jail still awaiting trial for the riot.” 
Predictably in July 1994 the issue of public discussion was Muslim- 
Christian relations and in particular the allegation that Muslim ‘fundamen- 
talists’ were involved in arson attacks. Given the historic exclusion of 
Muslims from secular education and the prominence of Missions in 
providing secular education, such allegations were a logical extension of 
Christian fears. 
Fear and distrust were palpable among middle-class, educated Tanza- 
nians who earnestly discussed schisms which had developed between long- 
time friends, some of whom suddenly, it was said, had declared themselves 
to be Muslim and had terminated personal and professional relationships 
with Christians. Christians alleged that Muslims had burned down a church 
in Kibaha and threatened to bomb a cathedral. Worst of all, the 
government, and especially the (Muslim) president, stood accused of turning 
a blind eye to such activities, and in effect encouraging fundamentalists! 
Local opinion unequivocally linked the rise of ‘fundamentalism’ - by 
which they meant the rapid growth of religious (Muslim and evangelistic 
Christian) organisations - to the economic liberalisation initiatives of 1984. 
This was also the year Nyerere stepped down from the presidency and 
personally nominated his successor Ali Hassan Mwinyi - a Muslim with 
strong connections to Zanzibar - who was duly elected. While the ‘pork 
butcheries’ incident was seen as signposting a fundamental shift in 
Christian-Muslim relations, the question which went unasked was, how 
such a situation had come to pass? 
One contributory factor was the public school system established by the 
Christian missions which sought to by-passlcontain areas dominated by 
Islam. Because Ibadhi Arabs did not proselytise Africans, conversion was 
restricted to the coast. Indeed, away from the coast and with the exception 
of Uganda, there was no noticeable Islamic proselytisation until the 1890s, 
roughly the same time that Christian missions first began to experience 
success (Oliver 1970: 203). Interestingly, the major Islamic influence in the 
interior was not Arab traders but the presence of German East African 
(Sudanese Muslim) soldiers and coastal Muslim Swahili officials of the 
German colonial administration. 
European missionaries were acutely aware of the expansion of Islam in 
the years preceding World War I. However, while the missions attempted to 
check the advance of Islam by strategically opening stations or posts to 
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fence-in Muslim enclaves, they were also competing amongst themselves for 
adherents (Iliffe 1979: 218ff.; Oliver 1970: 207). It appears that the 
consolidation of colonial control provided a foundation for the expansion 
of Christianity and Islam. The success of missions in gaining adherents had 
been indifferent until this time, perhaps because many had been established 
as relatively closed communities - the Roman Catholics, for example, built 
missions to minister to freed slaves (Versteijnen 1968). 
One major reason for the phenomenal growth of Christianity between 
1914 and 1944 stemmed from the growing demand for formal education 
which only the missions provided. State education was slow to develop and 
limited in scope, nearly always working together with the missions and 
predominantly focused in towns and up-country non-Muslim areas. In part 
this had to do with ad hoc colonial accommodations with local Muslim 
clergy who mistrusted ‘secular’ schools (Elmasri 1987; Sperling 1993), but 
by and large government, deliberately or otherwise, failed to make 
education available to Muslims. 
The end result of this policy, pursued consistently through to the present, 
has been to restrict Muslims to Koranic schools condemning them to 
unskilled and poorly paid work (Lockwood 1989: 177ff.) at the same time 
as their home districts remained undeveloped. The historic character of 
religious conversion is such that in the popular imagination specific ethnic 
groups are perceived to be either Muslim or Christian, a distinction which 
corresponds roughly to that between the uneducated and educated, and to 
the geographic division between the coast and the interior. 
It is worth discussing the very different attitudes that Muslims and 
Christians have towards education and educational reform. The vast 
majority of Tanzania’s African Muslims are Sunni and were converted 
largely through the work of a small number of Sufi tariqa or brotherhoods 
after 1870 (Nimtz 1980: ch. 3). In some cases the tariqa, organised around a 
sheik and his murid (disciples), arrived after Islam had already been 
introduced to the area and helped to ‘deepen the commitment of Muslims 
to their religion’. In other cases the tariqa was the agent for conversion 
(ibid: 65). 
In the words of Lamin Sanneh, Islamic reformers in Africa have sought 
to ‘sacralize . _ _  the cultural milieu that properly conveys the mission of 
Islam’ (1994: 33); in effect this meant enhancing ‘the primacy of Arabic in 
scripture, law and devotion’ which alone provides the convert with the 
means to understand and participate in Islam. Muslim scriptures are, 
therefore, non-translatable and must be approached through a proper 
understanding of Arabic. In East Africa, as elsewhere, important exceptions 
to this tenet have arisen from the manner in which Islamic conversion was 
achieved. 
One area of controversy within Islam concerns the role of the Sufi tariqa 
and its accommodation to local (African) culture in the form of dhikr ritual 
- a continuous repetition of various words or phrases in praise of God 
116 John Campbell 
accompanied by ‘African’ drumming and dancing, which is said to result in 
the achievement of an ecstatic state (Nimtz 1980: ch. 4; Parkin 1994). 
Despite the appeal of dhikr for converts - which has had marked success 
since at least the early 1930s - it is seen as a heresy by Zanzibar-based 
Wahhabi reformers who belong to the Ibadhi sect (Parkin 1995). However, 
as an example of cultural hybridity, dhikr is a typical accommodation to 
local conditions and has occurred widely as part of the process of 
Islamisation. 
Another important deviation from Sunni religious tenets concerns the 
crucial role played by Kiswahili in the propagation of Islam in East Africa. 
Balda notes that some Sunni leaders have insisted on the adoption of 
Kiswahili, as opposed to Arabic, as the means of reaching and educating 
East Africans, since this is the regional lingua franca. Kiswahili is in fact the 
medium of Islamic education in madrasa (schools) throughout the region. 
In the absence of a consensus within the East African Muslim commu- 
nity, conflicting positions have been taken over the use of Arabic versus 
Kiswahili: while some continue to insist that Arabic should be the language 
for teaching and propagating Islam, others systematically employ Kiswahili 
to write about Islam and to instruct believers in the Islamic faith. In part, 
this split represents a cultural predisposition of East African Muslims and 
the linguistic dominance of Kiswahili, in part it represents factional 
differences over the authenticity of divergent interpretations of faith/ 
scripture, and in part it represents growing political differences over 
acceptance of the secular status quo separating religion and politics (Balda 
1993: 237). Indeed, the first translation of the Koran into Kiswahili occurred 
in 1953 (by the Ahmadiyya sect) and was followed by subsequent 
translations by Sh. Abdallah Saleh Farsy; both translations fanned the 
debate even as it made the Koran accessible to East Africans (Trimingham 
1964: ch. 3; Elmasri 1987). 
Christianity, on the other hand, has long been noted for its efforts to 
translate the Bible into vernacular languages as a means of gaining 
adherents. a process which led to the indigenisation of the church (Sanneh 
1994). This process was based partially on the importance of literacy for 
reading the Bible, which gave Christianity its authority, and upon the 
militant fervour and organisational strength of village catechists and 
evangelists who preached ‘a Manichean view of the world as a struggle 
between light and darkness’ in which non-Christian customs had no place 
(Iliffe 1979: 227). Unlike Muslims, Christians saw good vernacular transla- 
tions as facilitating propagation of the faith. 
Differential access to formal education had the effect of structuring 
inequality in the labour market and, together with fundamentally different 
attitudes toward education in Christian and Muslim communities, has gone 
hand-in-hand with a quite different involvement in secular politics by 
Christians and Muslims. For example, one effect of nearly thirty years of 
one-party governance was to limit political opposition. Unions, agricultural 
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cooperatives, local government, religious organisations, even households 
were integrated into the party. In part this led to growing public disaffection 
as CCM became increasingly unresponsive; and in part it gradually resulted 
in the delegitimisation of the institutions coopted by CCM. 
Muslim involvement in national politics has been quite different from 
that of Christians in that the larger churches have their own development 
programmes to assist local parishes. Muslims, on the other hand, were 
enrolled in the construction of ujummu through the Sufi tariqa. Because the 
brotherhoods were successful in promoting the interests of African members 
against the Arab ‘ufuma, they became the organisational basis for local 
African politics and played an important role in mobilising political support 
for TANU in the 1950s and 1960s (Nimtz 1980: 184). The establishment of 
BAKWATA in the 1960s may in the long run have undermined the 
creditability of local sheiks through their association with an increasingly 
ineffective government. 
Locked increasingly into official programmes, the extent to which sheiks 
have become discredited in the eyes of their followers depends upon local 
perceptions about the benefits of government programmes. In the 1960s, 
Muslims assumed that an African government would make a significant 
difference to their lives through development programmes and the elimina- 
tion of Indian and Arab economic power (Nimtz 1980: 188). In recent years, 
however, ‘foreign’ economic influence has grown with the opening-up of the 
economy under structural adjustment. 
Recently the authority of local sheiks is likely to be undermined by the 
arrival of new religious leaders, nationals trained in the Arab world who are 
more likely to disagree with their predecessors over Islamic education and 
the role of Kiswuhifi (Constantin 1993: 188; Parkin 1994, 1995). If the older 
generation of sheiks are perceived to have compromised their religious 
responsibilities and/or if the costs of involvement with government are 
perceived to have been high in relation to benefits, dissension over the 
existing commitment to the secular status quo will grow. Evidence that 
dissension exists comes from events in 1990 when the ‘Union of Muslim 
Preachers of Related Religions’ (UWAMDI) based at Mtoro Mosque in 
Dar es Salaam denounced BAKWATA and called for the removal of its 
leadership, and from a government ban preventing UWAMDI from holding 
public rallies (Balda 1993: 228ff.). 
The religious undercurrent among Sunni Muslims is complicated. On the 
one hand, structural changes have exacerbated poverty and marginalised a 
majority of the population. African Muslims appear to be re-evaluating 
their involvement in and commitment to government programmes which 
have brought limited benefits and have advanced the interests of better 
educated Christians and foreign business. At the same time support from 
Iran - in the form of Islamic literature (e.g. publications, videos), 
development aid, and assistance channelled through the local Shia 
Ithna’ashari community - has grown. Nearer to home, Wahhabi reformists 
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in Zanzibar have persistently pushed an Islamist agenda of religious reform 
at the same time that Muslim and other political interests have agitated to 
increase the island’s autonomy from the mainland. Religious currents 
appear to tap a deep well-spring of discontent about the dislocations 
associated with political liberalisation and structural adjustment which 
means that Islamist calls for reform are fundamentally political. 
Social and religious cross-currents in Islam, within Zanzibar and with the 
mainland suggest that Islamist calls for refondrenewal are based in the 
rivalry between different religious leaders and the state (each of which seeks 
to make use of Islamic discourses about identity) as well as upon local 
traditions of popular culture and protest (E. Burke 1988). This is not to say 
that Islamists elsewhere are uninfluential, but rather, that at present the 
majority of Sunni Muslims are more concerned with local-national politics 
and that in this context political protest is articulated partially as a call for 
reform. In short, popular culture and local political contests result in the 
invocation of religion (e.g. Islam) and ethnicity to meet the objectives of 
local leaders. With the collapse of nationalism new forms of protest and 
collective action appear to be emerging in which protestors draw upon a 
broad range of ideas and ideologies concerned with social justice including 
Islam which increasingly informs local cultural understandings (Lubeck 
1988). 
In Zanzibar the political process has evolved differently. Here local and 
national issues are intertwined with the fractious nature of parliamentary 
politics, especially Zanzibar’s attempt to contravene the Union constitution. 
From one perspective, politics revolves around the same set of actors and 
institutional interests pursuing power and advantage as of old, that is, the 
entrenched position of CCM and the long-established Zanzibari opposition 
to CCM, CUF (Chege 1994; van Cranenburgh 1996). The relative strength 
of both parties altered in recent years due to political realignments on 
Zanzibar in which the ruling CCM party represented conservative and 
Islamist values, while CUF assumed an oppositional stance vis-a-vis CCM, 
Islamists and the mainland while also seeking autonomy for the isles. 
CCM’s handling of the 1995 elections, including its efforts to hamstring 
opposition parties and its opposition to Zanzibari succession, split the vote 
between CUF and CCM with the latter unilaterally declaring itself the 
winner of the elections.’* The net effect of the political process has been to 
‘produce an assertive Islamic movement within and outside CCM’ which 
has allies in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf (Chege 1994: 66). 
The bitterly contested fight over of the role of ethnicity, race and religion 
in Tanzanian politics operates at three levels: the sociocultural (i.e. the 
production of public identity), the political and the economic. Above all 
else, the intensity of feeling which infuses this debate concerns which 
group’s definition of culture and identity is to be adopted to define national 
identity now that the secular nationalist programme has collapsed. As 
Richard Fox has argued, ‘a national culture is always “temporary” because, 
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whether antique or modem, its character and puissance are matters of 
historical practice: they are plastic constructions, not cultural givens’ (1 990: 
4). As Fox and others make clear, ethnicity, racial identity and nationalism 
are alike not only in that they are deeply felt and durable, but also because 
they are cultural productions of public identity. As such, they are ideologies 
which articulate a conception of a common Tanzanian culture which 
compels individuals into action by (re)defining social boundaries within 
which new social bonds are produced and/or old ones are recast, a process 
which generates strong individual commitment (ibid: 7). 
Structural adjustment and political liberalisation have set in motion a 
deep-seated political debate not only over the question of who should 
benefit from state policies and about the legitimacy of the distributive 
mechanisms the state should use (Williams 1989: 405). As a result, local and 
national politics has become hotly contested and has increasingly polarised 
public attitudes and perceptions. In attempting to make sense of the conflict 
and to secure their own interests, individuals draw upon current ideas, 
images and information and participate in different types of social 
collectivities in pursuit of their objectives (Appadurai 1990). 
Economically, local-level conflict is perceived as ethnic rivalry (and may 
or may not escalate depending upon wider circumstances), whereas regional 
and national political interests tend to present themselves and the nature of 
the conflict in more universalistic terms. For example, the increased salience 
of ethnicity and religion in Tanga (Booth et al. 1993: 11 5) ,  central Tanzania 
(Ostberg 1995) and Zanzibar (Parkin 1995) is predominantly concerned with 
local contestations with key ethnic/religious ‘Others’. At the national level, 
however, the 1995 national elections resulted in a realignment of local- 
national politics linking notions of ethnicity to a globalised ‘post-socialist 
rhetoric’ as locals supported specific political parties (Moore 1997). At each 
level political discourse increasingly represents its protagonists in stereotypic 
terms as belonging to a bounded, culture-bearing, homogeneous social 
group. It is but a short step from the employment of universalist categories 
as a means of articulating one’s perspective to a situation where perceptions 
of difference become conventions which increasingly govern social relation- 
ships. 
However, while locals increasingly deploy notions of ethnicity, race and 
religion in conformity with global structures of common difference, the 
specific meaning of such terms emerges only in the political arena through 
the constant realignment of factions, groups and parties (Wilk 1995). The 
political process also ensures that, in relation to a specific situation or event, 
each group’s interests are defined as one of a pair of dichotomous terms 
whose essential identity is based on an opposite, specific other (in the 
process collapsing boundaries between certain social categories). Thus, at 
the national level conflict over the status of the Union conjoins walala hoi 
(mainlanders) against warabu (Arabs/Muslims) or Tanzanians against 
Zanzibaris. However, the relevant dichotomy may contractfexpand to 
120 John Campbell 
excludehnclude Christian (predominately mainlanders) against Muslim 
(predominantly Zanzibari) should the issues impinge on ‘religion’. Similarly, 
on the mainland urban conflict tends to be articulated as ‘racial’ (i.e. 
between African vs. Asian) or, in the context of participation in develop- 
ment programmes it can assume a ‘religious’ dimension (i.e. Christian vs. 
Muslim). Local level conflict involves groups and individuals who occupy 
the same social space relative to national politics, thus, in the islands 
Wapemba vs. Waunguja (natives of Pemba and Zanzibar islands, respec- 
tively) divide with respect to each other but stand together vis-h-vis the 
mainland. 
Conclusion: citizenship versus fundamentalism? 
The debate in Tanzania as elsewhere in Africa concerning the role of 
ethnicity, religion and nationalism in national culture is foregrounded in 
socioeconomic decline and underlying contradictions between civicherri- 
torial and ethnickultural conceptions of the state. This uneasy relationship 
is further complicated by the increasing global connectivity which promotes 
and sustains the flow of ideas, information, capital and technology within 
and across national and social boundaries (Appadurai 1990). 
From independence until the late 1980s, ethnicity, race and religion were 
explicitly excluded from national political life because the ruling political 
party believed they had no role to play in a secular, socialist agenda of 
kujenga taifa (nation-building) and because to admit their importance could 
have seriously jeopardised the political union imposed on Zanzibar. 
However, the failure of ujamrnalsocialism has eroded the salience of secular 
nationalism. At the same time, the collapsing authority of the ruling 
political party and the state coincided with the proliferation of political 
parties and religious organisations and has helped undermine national 
institutions. 
Elsewhere in the region the failure of nationalism and the post-colonial 
political programmes built upon it - whether ‘socialist’ or ‘capitalist’ - has 
opened wide cracks in the hegemonic project of the political elite to 
dominate society and define the nature of national identity with its encoded 
understandings about citizenship that sustains the legitimacy of the political 
system. The result is that a new vista of possibilities for contemporary 
politics and identity formation has emerged in the 1990s which take as their 
starting point the state and its role in class and ethnic stratification. 
In Kenya the legitimacy of the state and elite politics has increasingly 
been called into question by Arap Moi’s deliberate undermining of the 
National Assembly and attempts to eliminate opposition and dissent 
(Hornsby and Throup 1992). Moi’s efforts to silence his critics, marginalise 
Kikuyu opponents and build a ‘Kalinjin-centric state’ has destroyed the 
Kenyan economy and increased factional strife at a time of rapidly growing 
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demographic pressure; it has also provided a window of opportunity 
through which the IMF and Western donors have attempted to influence 
Kenyan politics (Chege 1994). 
Similarly the multiparty elections held in Malawi in 1994 were the first 
since the demise of Banda and his repressive party (Kaspin 1995). As in 
Kenya, the one-party state led to the enrichment of a class of politicians and 
an evident development bias towards Banda’s own ethnic group. Banda’s 
attempt to model Malawi national identity on Chewa culture failed to 
integrate two-thirds of the population, in the process contributing to 
political unrest, economic stagnation and the development of a viable 
political opposition. 
Superficially the situation in Ethiopia would appear quite different from 
Tanzania, Kenya and Malawi (Zegeye and Abate 1996; Gilkes 1996). 
However, the political programme being pursued by the Ethiopian People’s 
Revolutionary Democratic Front (the EPRDF), the name of the Tigrayan- 
dominated coalition of forces which ousted the Mengistu regime in 1991, is 
faced with exactly the same concerns, namely: the need to legitimate its 
specific objectives as a truly national programme (in the face of potentially 
powerful nationalist opposition forces), and to institutionalise itself through 
constitutional reform, the use of police and military force, and the creation 
of alliances with regional elites to compete in the electoral process. Here the 
basis of ‘national’ identity is closely associated with specific ethnonationalist 
interests which makes the EPRDF project particularly problematic because 
non-Tigrayans are unwilling to buy into what they see as a Tigrayan ethnic 
agenda. Nominally, the Ethiopian state has always combined elements of 
civic identity - common rights, a unified territory, a single economy - with 
certain ethnic and religious notions to define the nation. However, this 
uneasy combination of civic and ethnic concepts has always been manipu- 
lated to suit the group in power, and has contributed to the failure to 
develop a plural concept of nation based upon a genuinely shared public 
culture in which no one group is privileged. Seen in these terms, EPRDF 
efforts are likely to depend on the continued use of force to ensure 
compliance with policy, potentially a very high price which has brought 
down previous regimes. 
The key issues concerns the role of the one-party state and the 
sociocultural basis upon which such regimes have sought to construct the 
‘nation’. In merely seeking to shore up an increasingly narrow political base 
and stifle the opposition, one-party states have contributed directly to the 
expansion of political conflict and instability by rendering the formal 
political system redundant as a means of influencing policy, ensuring 
political accountability, and integrating the population into the political 
system. Instead of seeking to promote political plurality through the 
establishment of accountable institutions, the state has been used to recruit 
and manage a political elite, while national institutions have become little 
more than talking shops. Tanzania, unlike Ethiopia, Kenya or Malawi, 
122 John Campbell 
initially sought to construct the nation on a secular - non-ethnic and non- 
religious - basis; it seems, however, that a pragmatic concern with power on 
the part of CCM, played out in the context of economic decline, under- 
mined institutional accountability and public trust in the stated objectives of 
national programmes. 
Jonathan Friedman has argued that cyclical expansions and contractions 
of the world system are the fundamental dynamic driving the process of 
social and cultural fragmentation in states like Tanzania which are 
characterised by ethnic and nationalist ferment (1989). While East Africa 
may be peripheral to capital accumulation in North America and Europe, 
the above discussion indicates the key role played in this process by a 
national elite whose mismanagement of the state has contributed directly to 
economic decline and escalating political conflict. The legitimacy of elite 
politics has everywhere come under close scrutiny and attack led increas- 
ingly by middle-class beneficiaries of state policies who are playing an 
increasingly pivotal role in opposition politics. 
In Tanzania, current fears have their basis in growing social inequality 
and a concern that changes in the status quo could irretrievably disadvan- 
tage those who are poorly organised. A perception of relative advantage/ 
disadvantage fuels uncertainty, which feeds into new visions of the future 
and attempts to create new organisations and ideologies to replace older, 
discredited ones. Collective perceptions of the past together with contem- 
porary calculations of self-interest strongly influence social action, un- 
leashing forces which may well undermine political stability. 
In a climate of political and economic liberalisation, Tanzanians are 
increasingly confronting one another in social, economic and political 
arenas on unequal terms, the perception of which feeds into increasing 
efforts, especially by the elite, to organise on the basis of ideas about 
ethnicity and religion to secure or preserve advantage. The declining 
authority of the state and the re-emergence of ethnicity and religion as 
significant factors in current sociopolitical realignments strongly suggests 
not only that the one-party state, even if it has the backing of the military, 
will be unable to manage national politics and, further, that no government, 
whatever its composition, is likely to secure sufficient national support for 
its policies unless and until steps are taken to ensure that politicians and 
political institutions are publicly accountable and that political decision- 
making is based on the development of a civic public culture. 
Notes 
1 Source: http://:csf.Colorado.EDU:70/00/1/960414.tan. Failing_Education-System. 
2 Source: Dnily News (here after DN) 1 1  August 1993, ‘Death threats case postponed’. 
3 DN, 25 January 1995, p. 3; and 26 January ‘Saturday riots ~ Dar police question Mtikila’. 
4 DN 28 January 1995, front page leader. ‘When asked to make a plea he said “Ni ndoto, siyo 
kweli” (this is a dream, it is not true). Prosecution objected to bail’. 
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5 DN 28 January 1995 p. 3; DN 2 February 1995: ‘Parents allege tribalism in Songea School’; 
6 DN 10 April 1993, ‘Tanzanians mark Good Friday’. 
7 DN 10 July 1993, ‘Pork shops: witnesses disallowed’; DN 17 April 1993 ‘Sheik Yahya in 
court - nine youths face petrol bomb charge’. 
8 DN 24 April 1993, ‘12 more Muslim zealots charged’; but see a photo of the demonstration 
printed on the front page of The Tribune of 5-11 August 1994, showing hundreds of people 
peacefully gathered at the demonstration. 
9 DN 8 May 1993, ‘Demonstration charges against 24 withdrawn’, and ‘All is set for 
BAKWATA meeting’. 
10 Source: http://:csf.Colorado.EDU:7O/OO/i9409 15.tan.Islamic fundamentalism. 
11 DN 18 August 1994, ‘Court asked to recall Mrema’. 
12 Cf. ‘Zanzibar’s ballot hopes betrayed’, The Guardian, 4 November 1996, p. 12. 
DN 11 February, ‘Ikwiriri project impresses Iran’, respectively. 
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